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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW
D ,AcLroay JuDGZwNrs.-The Connecticut legislature passed an act in
igai authorizing courts to make binding declarations of rights. The act
was attacked as unconstitutional on the same ground raised by the supreme
court of Michigan against the Michigan Declaratory Judgment Act in the
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case of Anway v. Railway Co., 211 Mich. 592, 12 A. L. R. 26i namely, that
declaring rights was not a judicial function. But the Supreme Court of
Errors of Connecticut sustdined the act as in no way contravening the con-
stitution. Braman v. Babcock (Conn., 1923), i2o Atl. *5o.
The court devoted very little space in its opinion to the Anay case.
It only said lhat it had read that case and also the case of State v. Grove,
1o9 Kan. 619. which sustained the Kansas Declaratory Judgment Act, and
that the reading oi those cases confirmed it in its view that the Declaratory
Judgment Act merely provided a novel mode of judicial procedure which
was entirely free from the constitutional objection raised.
In answer to the assertion that declaring rights was not a judicial func-
tion, the court said: "Could it be claimed with any pretense of reason that
the function was legislative or executive? The answer is obvious. We
must then conclude that the function is judicial or that it falls outside of
the three functions described as legislative, executive, or judicial. It would
be a travesty to hold that this method of remedial justice could find no
place in our system of government unless a place was made for it by an
amendment of the Constitution. * * * We are not, therefore, required to
hold that under our Constitution the general assembly is forbidden to enlarge
our customary method of remedial justice by authorizing the novel mode
of judicial procedure of permitting courts to render declaratory judgments,
and thus to close the door to the use in this state of a method of judicial
procedure which for more than half a century has been used to the great
benefit of the commonwealth and people by those using kindred methods
of jurisprudence, as in Great Britain. To hold that the judicial power of
.this state is confined to the consideration of cases where consequential relief
only is sought would be enforcing a limitation upon judicial power in accord
with custom rather than with reason and logic."
Since the decision of the .-tnway case, Virginia (Acts, 1922, ch. 517)
and Kentucky (Acts, 1922, ch. 83), as well as Kansas (Laws. i921, ch. 168)
-and Connecticut (Public Acts, 1921, Ch. 258), have enacted similar statutes,
and the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act has been prepared, approved,
and recommended by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. As said
by Judge Thomas R. Gordon, of Kentucky, in discussing The Law of Declar-
atory Judgments and its Progress, in the VIRGINIA LAW REvIEw for January,
1923. "It may be assumed that the Anway case was not regarded as authority
by any of those who participated in the drafting or adoption of any of those
acts. That is certainly true as to those having in hand the preparation and
consideration and ultimate passage of the Kentucky statute."
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